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STRATA CONTROL IN UNDERGROUND COAL MINES
A RISK MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
Chris Allanson1

INTRODUCTION
Hawcroft Miller Swan (HMS) reviews approximately 120 mines per year, around the world. Of these
approximately 60% mine coal and the remainder metal and other minerals. Also approximately 60% of these
mine underground. From our experience it is apparent that the mines with a well-developed understanding of
their risk profile and a systematic approach to the way they do business, enjoy better business outcomes in terms
of safety, productivity, cost control, profitability and reputation. Others without systems in place, consume a
phenomenal amount of time and energy dealing with day-to-day issues, without ever gaining effective control of
the critical issues that drive their business.
This paper seeks to share HMS experiences in relation to risk management in Australia with particular focus on
the underground coal mining industry of New South Wales and Queensland and geotechnical matters. It provides
a brief overview of the legislation in both states and the use of risk assessment in relation to statutory compliance
and as a business management tool. Comment on the benefits and limitations of risk assessments are given from
the perspective of an organisation providing risk management services to the industry, or utilising industryspecific examples.
Over the past decade the Australian underground coal industry and the mining industry in general has experienced
an increasing application of risk assessment processes as a proactive initiative for improving safety. Tougher
economic, environmental and legal pressures, coercion from employee, government and social groups (including
local trade unions and the ILO), the recognition that a contract of employment does not include acceptance of
personal injury and an awakening to the principles of due diligence, have all fuelled this new perspective.
It is true that underground coal mining is inherently more hazardous than other industries, but this doesn’t mean
we should simply accept it to be more dangerous. Accident investigation has demonstrated that in most cases
sufficient information was present before an accident for someone to have intervened and prevented it from
occurring.
In the philosophy of risk management, the fatalistic acceptance that accidents will happen has been replaced by
the realisation that impending loss is in most cases predictable and therefore preventable.
Damage control and reactivity in Australia has been overtaken by active participation to gain understanding of the
hazards before engineering changes, implementing systems and building competence to gain effective control by
eliminating or effectively mitigating the risks. The process most widely used is risk assessment. Done properly,
this process incorporates local knowledge and experience with external expertise in a forum where the principles
of involvement and consensus are used to identify and prioritise hazards and to recommend appropriate means of
controlling risk.
On average HMS facilitate one risk assessment every two weeks. Risk assessment topics and applications vary
from the very simple to the subtly complex. Some organisations are quite experienced with the risk assessment
process and embrace it for all the benefits it provides, while others are in denial, applying the process because of
statutory compliance or corporate directive. The more experienced workplaces have become quite adept with the
process and efficiently achieve significant benefits while others need on-going education and coaching to get it
right then battle through as management and workplace cultures are reprogrammed away from the compliancebased mindset.
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WHY DO RISK ASSESSMENTS
In general there are two main reasons why mines do risk assessments – for statutory compliance or because within
the organisation there is a higher level of appreciation for the benefits of a risk management and a systematic
approach to operating their business.
For those that embrace the risk management philosophy there is the acceptance that good safety performance, like
good productivity are simply outcomes of a well-managed system.
From a world wide perspective Australia seems to be leading the pack when it comes to risk management and the
utilisation of the risk assessment process for safety and whole of business considerations. Mines reviewed
throughout mainland Europe and the United States were generally not using risk assessment as part of their
business management strategy. Some US mine operators are not familiar with a generic risk matrix. South
African mines have a greater appreciation of the risk assessment process. Having been introduced to the
philosophy in 1996, they are a couple of years behind Australia and have confined its use to purely health and
safety applications.
Larger international corporations such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Shell/ Anglo Coal have embraced risk
management and incorporated the philosophy as a Corporate Standard and irrespective of the country, those sites
are in general, well advanced in applying the process.
In NSW risk assessment was introduced approximately ten years ago and eagerly promoted by the Chief Inspector
of Coal Mines. Since that time and subsequent to the Moura Inquiry, the Queensland coal industry followed suit.
Both states moved to enshrine risk assessment in legislation in 1999. NSW and Queensland are equally well
advanced in their application of risk management and in particular, risk assessments.
More recently the Western Australian Department of Mines required mandatory risk assessments for justifying
areas wherever rock bolting is not adopted following significant strata-related failures and fatalities.
Despite Australia having the jump on the rest of the world in risk management there is by no means reason to
become complacent in the sense of a job well done. There is still a long way to go and no excuse to not continue
to be the world leader.
STATUTORY COMPLIANCE
The principles of risk management in Australian Mining Legislation are either by direct reference or through the
imposition of Australian Standards, “accepted practice and due diligence”.
Underground coal mines in New South Wales currently operate under the NSW Coal Mines Regulation Act 1982,
No. 67 (“CMRA 1982”, “The Act”) and the NSW Coal Mines Regulations 1999 - General and Underground (“The
1999 Regulations”, “CMR Gen 1999”, “CMR U/G 1999”). In Queensland the Coal Mining Safety & Health Act
1999 (“CMS&HA 1999”) and the Coal Mining Safety & Health Regulations 1999 (“The 1999 Regulations”,
“CMS&HR 1999”) are the current statutory instruments for administering underground coalmines. The
interrelationships between these legislation and corresponding occupational health and safety legislation have not
been considered in this paper.
The NSW 1999 Regulations have introduced the principles of risk management over the existing framework of
the CMRA 1982. The resultant NSW legislation is a combination of prescription and self-regulation, however in
the ability to self regulate, mines are required to develop and implement systems for specified core risk1 areas, e.g.
inrush, ventilation and emergency escape. The pre-existing Act of 1982 remains for now unchanged and the
requirement for Managers to make Rules and Schemes continues.
The first reference to strata control in the CMRA 1982 is Section 37 (2) (c) (ii) which defines one of the functions
of the Mine Manager as “ensure that the roof and sides of working places and roadways in the mine (other than
roadways located in a part of the mine which is fenced off in pursuance of the regulations) are adequately
supported where necessary for safety”.
1

Core risk areas are areas of operation of coal mines with generic hazards that have the potential to cause multiple
fatalities.
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Later in the Act Section 102 requires the Mine Manager as to make support rules, while Section 105 requires that
those rules are provided to the District Inspector for Confirmation.
In the NSW Underground Regulations, Division 9 sets out in detail the Support Rules. Clause 48 prescribes in
detail the process of developing, implementing and monitoring Support Rules and specifically includes the
following matters:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

estimate the types of geological conditions likely to be encountered in roadway development
assessment of the stability of roadways to be developed in geological conditions likely to be encountered
development of support measures that will provide roadway stability in geological conditions likely to be
encountered
preparation of support plans that explain in full detail the means of roadway support required to be
installed and prepared in a manner such that they may be readily understood by those required to install
roadway support
provision of safe, effective and systematic work methods for the installation, and subsequent removal
where required, of roadway support (including support in connection with the carrying out of roof
brushing operations)
provision of adequate equipment and resources to effectively install or remove roadway support
monitoring of the stability of roadways after formation and support installation
training of employees, including; support design principles, support plan interpretation, placement and
removal, understanding the need for and importance of the various support systems, recognition of
indicators of change that may affect roadway stability
recording of geological features that may affect roadway stability
recording of roof failures that have the potential to cause injury to persons
conducting of periodic compliance audits (not exceeding 12 months)
reviewing of the application and effectiveness of the support rules at intervals not exceeding 12 months.

In a further requirement of Division 7 – Working Dimensions and Breakaway Rules of the underground
Regulations the Manager must make Breakaway Rules “for fixing the maximum width of intersections, the manner
of commencement of drivage of roadways, showing the sequence of forming the intersections and the manner of
support”.
In Section 37 (2) (h) “the manager must ensure he is in possession of all available information relevant to the
behaviour of strata surrounding the mine and its relationship to the safe working of the mine and all available
information regarding disused excavations or workings in the vicinity of the mine”
In relation to the stability of workings, Clause 38 of NSW Underground Regulations and Section 139 of the Act
prescribe the minimum permitted pillar sizes and location and size of barriers respectively.
Although the NSW legislation can be considered largely prescriptive in nature, In Clause 6 of the general
Regulations, owners are required to assess risks to health or safety regularly and ensure that identified risks are
dealt with in the following order of priority:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

eliminate the risk,
control the risk at its source,
minimise the risk by means that include the design of safe work systems,
in so far as the risk remains, provide for the use of personal protective equipment,
having regard to what is reasonable, practicable and feasible, and to good practice
and the exercise of due diligence.”

Clause 6 locks the owner/ manager into adopting a risk-based assessment of operations in general (including strata
control). Indeed many NSW operators have already adopted a risk management approach to strata control and
routinely conduct risk assessments for new panel layouts as part of Section 138 Applications. Alternatively a risk
assessment may be required by an inspector on submission of Support Rules in accordance with Section 105 of
the Act for confirmation.
Many mines have developed support rules in the formof a strata control management system and incorporated
matters in addition to the prescribed matters of the Regulations. Furthermore compliance with Section 4.2.2 of
AS 4804 - Australian Standard for Risk Management Systems requires that hazard identification is adopted in the
development of safety management systems. Accepted processes are described in AS4360 and MDG1010.

The AusIM /Illawarra Branch

6-8 February 2002

137

2002 Coal Operators’ Conference

Tribute to Dr Ripu Daman Lama

In a similar manner Section 30 of the Queensland Act requires a risk management approach be adopted according
to the following criteria:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

identify
analyse
assess risk
avoid or remove unacceptable risk
monitor levels of risk and the adverse consequences of retained residual risk
investigate and analyse the causes of serious accidents and high potential incidents with a view to
preventing their recurrence
review the effectiveness of risk control measures, and take
appropriate corrective and preventive action
mitigate the potential adverse effects arising from residual risk

In general there are more direct references to adopt risk assessments in the Queensland Coal Mining 1999
legislation than the corresponding NSW legislation. The Act identifies strata control as a principal hazard,
requiring a hazard management plan to be developed while Clause 63 of the CMS&HA 1999 requires principal
hazard management plans to “identify, analyse and assess risk associated with principal hazards”. Irrespective of
this Section 4.2.2 of AS4804 requires that hazard identification is undertaken for the development of safety
management systems in general.
Section 29 of the Queensland CMS&HA 1999 places the responsibility of reducing the risk to persons from coal
mining operations to an “acceptable level” or within “acceptable limits” and “as low as reasonably achievable”.
This is similar to Clause 6 of the NSW General Regulations, requiring “reasonable, practicable and feasible, and
to good practice and the exercise of due diligence” from operators.
Clause 317 of the Regulations specifically requires that a risk assessment must be carried out for second workings
including consideration of the following matters:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

any surface features, artificial structures and water reserves that may create a hazard if disturbed by the
workings
any other workings located in close proximity above, below or adjacent to the proposed second
workings, whether in the same or an adjacent mine
known geology affecting the intended workings
anticipated gas make
pillar stability
proposed method and sequence of coal extraction
proposed methods for the following
strata control and support

Clause 318 required that the system of extraction be “based on” the risk assessment identified in Clause 317 and
Clause 320 requires a further risk assessment for subsequent changes to an extraction system.
Clause 323 (2) requires the underground mine manager to ensure suitable strata support methods are designed and
implemented for the working place. Unlike the NSW legislation the Queensland legislation refrains from defining
the process of design, implementation and monitoring of support systems.
In relation to the design and layout of panels and pillars, Section 138 CMRA 1982 requires that mines obtain
Ministerial approval for mining by methods other than bord and pillar (Pillar extraction, longwall or mini wall
mining, auger mining, punch mining, single entries). The NSW Department of Mineral Resources has published
guidance material for gaining a Section 138 Approval (MDG 1001 and MDG 1005 for extraction systems and
draft guide lines MDG 1011 for single entry drives). Reference to the assessment of risk is made in the guidance
material (and draft guidance material) and a Section 138 Approval is usually contingent upon a risk assessment
and a geotechnical assessment having been done as a minimum.
Clause 321 of the Queensland Regulations simply requires that mines ensure the stability of mine workings in
relation to pillar strength and stability and strata support requirements, while Clause 320 makes reference to
dangerous mine subsidence.
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It is apparent that whilst the legislation pushes mines to adopt a risk management approach to strata control, a
level of prescription has been retained as a safety net to maintain effective regulation.
OTHER REASONS
Despite the statutory requirements of the legislation, there are many other good reasons for conducting risk
assessments.
Risk assessments consider broader issues to a greater level of detail commensurate with the level of risk. Time is
not wasted addressing irrelevant matters and important issues are not skipped over to simply comply with
legislation.
It is not possible to prescribe in legislation and associated codes, standards and guidelines all the permutations to
cover all mines, their systems and mining conditions, let alone the other idiosyncrasies of each mine that are
relevant at the particular time. Risk assessment is a situational analysis whereby the subject can be assessed in the
context of its environment. Prescription does not incorporate the site specific knowledge and issues.
Risk assessment can be scoped broadly or focused to suite the need. Site personnel utilise the experience and
expertise to develop appropriate controls.
Risk assessments provide a forum in which to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

identify information gaps. When undertaken in the early stages of design, it has the ability to identify
whether more data or research is required in order to make properly informed decisions
determine if design assumptions are relevant and appropriate for the application
assess the impact on associated and related systems
allow balanced assessment and prioritisation of multiple and diverse risks. Bland compliance with
prescription limits the opportunity to manage the total system
provides opportunity to capture the full range of hazards relevant to the particular situation in terms of
business interruption, material damage and reputation - not only safety
flush out implementation issues

The process of identifying and quantifying and prioritising risk directs focus on the important issues so the mine
does not waste time pursuing pet topics or matters that prescription might otherwise set priority upon without it
being relevant at the particular mine. For example, outburst may not be of relevance at some mines but may be of
critical importance at others.
There are many examples of the limitations of prescription through Regulation and guidelines. One such example
in NSW is the failure of the Wardell guidelines to address all relevant matters in panel and pillar design. Mining
layouts designed in accordance with the specified guidelines did not take into account the behaviour of pillars with
claystone in the surrounding strata and resultant mine subsidence exceeded the design amount.
Where specific design guidelines are provided, there is a real danger that they can be misinterpreted or applied
incorrectly to geological/ mining conditions for which they were not intended. In some instances compliance with
specified guidelines has been interpreted as having followed a satisfactory design process. Prescription can
perpetuate an attitude where compliance is taken as sufficient without any further investigation. A full risk
assessment however, scoped to incorporate safety, business interruption, material damage and reputation will lead
operators to applying a level of rigour commensurate with acceptable risk exposure and utilise appropriate design
principles including proper engineering practice.
WHAT IS A RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is a structured situational analysis of a particular interaction between equipment/ people/
environment to identify, quantify and prioritise risk against a predetermined standard and identify appropriate
means of control.
There is no such thing as a “one size fits all” or a superior risk assessment technique. The Safety Systems Society
Handbook (1993) covers over seventy risk assessment techniques while the NSW Department of Mineral
Resources (DMR) publication MDG 1010 (DMR, 1997) provides examples of the most common techniques for
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the mining industry. Each has its own strengths and limitations. The question is which technique is most useful in
assessing strata control.
RISK ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES
This section briefly touches on some of the risk assessment techniques and their applicability to strata control in
underground coal mines.
The Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC) technique is commonly used throughout the industry for
identifying potential operational production and maintenance loss. It is the technique most commonly used.
WRAC has the capacity to focus on a variety of aspects including, support type, installation method, inspection
regimes and other activities. It can be applied in areas of the mine or at particular times of activity.
WRAC is most effective when it is scoped with appropriate detail, including clear objectives and the boundaries
of the system have been defined. Long and short term stability can also be assessed if known, depending on the
mining process used.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is used when it is necessary to show the logical structure of major undesired events by
graphical means. The outcome is highly visual for ease of understanding failure mechanisms. Fault Tree
Analysis may be extended to include a quantitative analysis, whereby probabilities of separate events are analysed
to give an overall probability of a particular major loss event. Data is often not available nor this level of analysis
necessary for mining applications. FTA can be very time consuming and produce few benefits beyond WRAC.
Both WRAC and FTA techniques however are good for identifying multiple failures. For example strata failure
due to one or all of the following would be identified:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Incorrect type of support used for conditions
Incorrect assessment of environmental conditions
Failure or inadequacy of inspections
Incorrect installation
Support equipment failure
Insufficient skills/ competencies

Human behaviour or error and equipment component failure studies need to be closely scoped so they do not
become unwieldy. Behavioural risk assessments can be difficult as they are dependent upon development of
templates for perfect behaviour. This is particularly difficult if multiple tasks are involved. They also assume that
the system, environment and machines are perfect, when in fact this is often not the case.
When dealing with machinery used for the installation of supports or working within a defined support regime the
Machinery Hazard Identification method may be appropriate.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is appropriate for focusing on hardware failures, and quantifying risk
if probability of failure can be defined. This technique is good for analysing equipment designs and modifications
and pre-commissioning assessment, for example development of a mobile bolter.
In general, qualitative risk assessments are adequate for most circumstances in the mining industry and
quantitative risk assessment may not even be possible because of an absence of reliable data.
An example of the commonly used WRAC (qualitative) risk assessment technique follows.
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Examples of qualitative descriptors for consequence are provided below in Table 1.
Table 1. – Qualitative Consequence Descriptors
Rating

Injury

1 – Catastrophic

Multiple Fatalities

2 – Major

Fatality

3 – Moderate

Serious Bodily Injury

4 – Minor

Lost Time Injury

5 – Insignificant

First Aid

A holistic view of mining activity in the context of the business can be taken by including additional consequence
descriptors such as business interruption, material damage, environmental impact and reputation. Many
Australian mines now include these considerations in risk assessments, having recognised the benefit of taking a
holistic view of the mine as a business. In practice the most severe risk, in terms of safety, business interruption,
material damage, environmental impact or reputation, is adopted.
This approach recognises that safety, like productivity and profitability are simply outcomes of a well-managed
system.
In determining the consequence, both instantaneous and cumulative loss should be considered. Subsidence, like
health related considerations should be considered from an exposure and repeat activity viewpoint to capture long
term consequences.
Examples of qualitative descriptors for likelihood which are self explanatory are provided below in Table 2. They
usually result in some conjecture and it is often necessary to remind risk assessment teams to risk rank in absence
of soft barriers.

A - Certain
Will occur

B - Probable
Likely to occur

C - Possible
Could occur

D - Remote
Unlikely to occur

E - Improbable
Practically
impossible

Table 2 – Qualitative Likelihood Descriptors
Risk is determined by considering the consequence and likelihood in relation to a matrix such as that shown below
in Table 3.
Table 3. Risk Matrix
A – Certain

B – Probable

C.- Possible

D – Remote

E - Improbable

1 – Catastrophic

1 (E)

3 (E)

5 (H)

7 (H)

11 (S)

2 – Major

2 (E)

4 (E)

8 (H)

12 (S)

16 (M)

3 – Moderate

6 (H)

9 (H)

13 (S)

17 (M)

20 (L)

4 – Minor

10 (S)

14 (S)

18 (M)

21 (L)

23 (L)

5 – Insignificant

15 (S)

19 (M)

22 (L)

24 (L)

25 (L)

The matrix shown in Table 3 is a 5 x 5 safety risk matrix. The number in each of the coloured cells indicates the
risk index for particular consequences and likelihood. One (1) is the most severe risk raking and twenty-five (25)
the least severe. Other risk matrices are available. Some don’t distinguish between single and multiple fatalities
and others are presented as 3 x 3 matrices. Most mining operations have found a risk assessment technique they
feel comfortable with, and have developed their own qualitative risk matrices based on AS/NZS4360 and MDG
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1010. It is worthwhile noting that it is impossible to achieve a risk rank lower than 1 E (11) for catastrophic
consequence unless the hazard is eliminated completely.
The most important task in risk assessment is to rate the likelihood and consequences, calculate the risk rank of all
related events that could result in loss and arrange those in order of priority to gain an understanding of the most
important areas.
Items can take the form of an activity, an object, a condition or a combination of these. People must clearly
describe what it is being ranked under the chosen heading in the table e.g. hazard or loss scenario, and be
consistent in the language used as this will help for later sorting.
While the risk assessment method chosen is important for capturing hazards and reflecting their seriousness, it is
the outcomes of the risk assessment that is most important. People should not take the risk rank as definitive nor
waste time haggling over the risk rank. Risk ranking it is not an exact quantification of risk but a means of
prioritising actions and allocating resources to control hazards.
Exposure data can be added to the equation, but separate reference is usually not warranted, as it can be reflected
in both likelihood and consequence ratings.
RISK ASSESSMENT TEAMS
Risk assessments can be done by an individual, however to maximise the breadth and depth of analysis, team
work is best. Individual assessments are best reserved for less complex tasks such as local risk control process,
job safety analysis (JSA) or hazard awareness. Group analysis is preferred for larger topics to take advantage of
the collective knowledge, experience and technical expertise of a group to provide a more comprehensive
coverage of the topic.
The benefit of utilising groups to assess risk include:
•
•
•
•
•

A cross section of people who are involved with planning, implementing, operating, monitoring and
reviewing the process are included, leading to more comprehensive coverage from all aspects or
perspectives, highlighting issues of which management or technical experts may not be aware.
Technical people become aware of implementation and operational issues they might not otherwise have
considered in the design.
Solutions will be practical for those required to implement them providing at least a chance they will be
implemented as designed.
Management can qualify the economic and operational feasibility of suggested solutions.
Suggested controls are likely to consider all competency, skills and literacy.

Risk assessments are usually not the forum for assessing geotechnical engineering design unless the participants
are technically qualified. Rather most risk assessments are used to check whether the correct design parameters
have been used for the proposed design and to consider implementation of the design in the mine environment.
HMS OBSERVATIONS
Despite the lack of direct reference by legislation requiring risk assessment for each type of system, mines have
adopted risk assessments as their preferred vehicle for incorporating consultation in developing and reviewing
safety management systems. In NSW strata is usually dealt with during the broad-brush risk assessment. The
depth to which sites drill down is dependent on the individual site.
Furthermore an increasing number of mines are taking the opportunity to consider business interruption, material
damage, environmental impact and reputation in addition to health and safety. Some have taken the process to the
next level to identify and evaluate up-side opportunities to determine appropriate improvement strategies.
Some mines do risk assessments for the sake of compliance and are inclined to allocate tight and often unrealistic
timeframes, grab personnel on rehabilitation to make-up numbers, exclude union participation and use strong
management direction to speed the process along. It is important to let the process unravel, identify the hazards
and potential loss, prioritise risk and specify controls and not lose sight of the objective of the exercise.
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Risk assessments are often disrupted by people with operational responsibilities attending to mine needs,
particularly at shift change. Some operations hold risk assessments off site or at times when other operational
personnel are available to avoid disruptions.
Risk assessment applications vary from the very simple to complex. Whilst strata issues may be dealt with at
some sites during wide broad brush risk assessments, other more detailed or very specific assessments deal with
particular mining systems or equipment. In some cases the assessment will consider a detailed design, including
the final draft of a geotechnical design, whilst others may take advantage of the risk assessment group to review
and identify hazards and controls on a range of panel design options. Unless the risk assessment team is
comprised of a team of expert personnel a risk assessment is not usually the appropriate forum to critique the
geotechnical design. However it is appropriate to identify how design assumptions can be compromised and to
identify additional or changed factors the geotechnical design may have neglected to address, e.g. wide roadways
are required to operate large mining machines.
It is also important to establish that the risk assessment team understand the process before commencement.
There is often need for a quick training session before commencement, although pre-assessment training is
becoming less common.
The site acceptance of the risk assessment process is variable. Some sites embrace the process as a valuable tool
that affords the opportunity to have a real impact on safety and business performance. Other sites see the system
as a matter of process or a waste of time and participate to fulfil some statutory criteria and take a passing interest
in the overall process. Generally the more familiarity the site with the process the more benefit is derived and the
more efficient it becomes.
There is a wide variation of risk tolerance across the industry. Risks that are acceptable to some mines are not to
others. Risk tolerance at particular sites can influence the outcome of the risk assessment and hence prevent
hazards being identified or appropriate controls being adopted.
Risk tolerance levels can develop in the culture as perceptions, built by a history of what has worked in the past,
and accepted practice accumulate in the collective memory of the organisation. Current operational constraints or
perception that risks are necessary in the interest of preserving jobs or cutting costs also have an effect. It could
also be simply a lack of risk management philosophy by management. An added danger is that if the facilitator is
not aware of a high level of risk tolerance the risk assessment teams could down rate risk or gloss-over important
hazards. Furthermore if the facilitator is a part of the same risk-tolerant culture the risk team may never be
challenged and high or extreme risks go unassessed. Closed-shop organisations may not be aware of the folly of
the things they do before it is too late.
It is important that all people in the risk assessment team reach consensus as the assessment proceeds. Repeated
interjection by overzealous people, with pre-set agendas or pre-determined outcomes can, if not controlled, result
in short cutting the process or extent of analysis. It is important that the facilitator ensures that all team members
get equal say before reaching consensus.
For tightly constrained risk assessments it is imperative that the scope reflects the timeframe of the assessment and
that all assumptions and limitations are properly defined, understood and carefully recorded. This helps to
circumvent the problem of people becoming sidetracked by incidental issues.
Most clients prefer to conclude the group session before finalising the action plan. For small risk assessments this
may not be a problem because the senior person in the team can ensure the actions are followed through.
Similarly for complex risk assessments it would be grossly inefficient to occupy the time of personnel allocating
tasks for hundreds of actions. Diligence however is required in follow-up to ensure actions are assigned to
appropriate personnel and that those actions are actually completed.
HMS conducted a review of a number of risk assessments covering the following strata-related topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Pillar extraction – Wongawilli, Pillar stripping, breaker line supports
Longwall extraction
Cut/ flit mining
Massive strata
Section 138 application
Mobile bolters
Longwall mining through disused shaft
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Drift excavation
In close proximity to overlying workings
Thin seam operations
TYPES OF STRATA HAZARDS

The review identified the following distribution by energy type is shown in Table 4
Table 4 Risk Data by Energy Type
Energy Type
Gravitational
Mechanical
Chemical
Thermal
Pressure

Proportion
82.4%
7.2%
6.4%
2.4%
1.6%

Whilst the vast majority of hazards are concerned with falling roof material a significant number of hazards relate
to the operation of equipment associated with roof control or a mining system being assessed for strata hazards.
Some examples although not exhaustive, of the types of hazards identified by the strata-related risk assessment
review are:
•

rib failure

•

operator position under unsupported roof

•

recover C/M from unsupported roof areas

•

ventilation disruption by choked goaf

•

windblast and gas emissions from goaf

•

undetected change in strata conditions, adverse geological conditions

•

roof failure in work areas adjacent to goaf

•

fall of roof between supports

•

BLS over-ridden by goaf fall

•

Person crushed by BLS or continuous miner

•

failure of supported ground, bed separation, anchor failure, poor installation or setting

•

shape & size of pillars or roadways, roadway alignment

•

pillar failure or collapse - punching, weak interfaces, width to height, grade

•

load transfer, abutment stress, periodic weighting, face slabbing

•

orientation to structures, joint sets, cleat

•

support setting or installation hazards

The diversity of the above list demonstrates the ability of the risk assessment process to flush out a broad array of
hazards. More importantly the list demonstrates how comprehensive a prescribed list of considerations might be
required in order to identify specific hazards for all mines.
Considering the examples listed above it is apparent that no level of prescription would identify relevant hazards
for each site. Two examples are set out below
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Example 1.
Consider the operation of a large remote control continuous miner in cut flit development under strong roof, with
good bridging properties. Two hazards at this operation could have been ranked as follows:
No
1

1

Area
Strata
Control

Strata
Control

No.

Activities/
Process

1.1

1.1

No.

Hazard

C

L

R

Remote
control
cutting

1.1.2

Crushed by
RC C/M in
5.5 m wide
roadway

1

C

4

Remote
control
cutting

1.1.1

Failure of
supported
Roof in 6.5 m
wide roadway

1

Existing
Controls



D

7





Safe Stand Areas
defined
Operator
competence
Support Rules
Inspections
Operator
competence

Additional
Controls
Drive wider
roadways for safe
clearance

Redesign
support system for
wider roadway.
 Design Support
System for the
place


In Example 1 the risk assessment has identified that the risk of the remote control continuous miner crushing the
operator is greater than that of being injured by a fall of supported roof. In mitigating risk, the risk assessment
team must deal with risks in order of severity – highest to least. The team could have decided that an appropriate
control to reduce the risk of crush injury from a continuous miner is to drive roadways wider to provide more
clearance. To make this recommendation the team must make the fundamental assumption that an alternative roof
support system can be designed for the wider roadway without increasing the risk to personnel by a fall of
supported roof.
The benefit of using risk assessment processes to distil priorities from an array of hazards is demonstrated by this
example. In the first instance the absolute necessity of protection personnel from falling roof material is the most
basic of mining practice, hence the provision of support. Secondly the C/M operator has highlighted the possible
danger ofworking in the vicinity of the RC C/M and offered a possible solution. If geologists and geotechnical
engineers are present they have the opportunity to comment on the concept of driving wider roadways and to give
an initial opinion as to whether effective redesign of support appears feasible. In addition, bolter operators can
assess the proposal with a knowledge of the operational capabilities of the mobile bolter. Management can have
input from the perspective of the impact on factors such as control of widths and cost of support. Fundamentally
the process provides a balanced approach and detailed assessment on the solution of seemingly conflicting
controls.
Having considered the proposal it is important to ensure the wording of the proposed control is consistent with the
intent of the workshop. In this case all indications at the time of the workshop are that the concept is feasible,
however the final width and support system design are as yet unresolved. Despite the column heading being
changed from “Additional Controls” to “Potential Controls” the entry may be better stated as “ Assess the
feasibility of wider roadways to provide more clearance”. The final decision will be based on a proper
geotechnical assessment and if in NSW gaining an exemption from the Department of Mineral Resources from the
relevant part of the Regulations.
It is important to clearly record the actual intent of the risk team in the potential controls to avoid confusion
during implementation or reviews.
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Example 2.
Reconsider an alternative situation where a remote control continuous miner is driving longwall gate roads in
weak roof.
No
1

1

Area
Strata
Control

Strata
Control

No.

Activities/
Process

1.1

Longwall
retreat

1.1

Gate road
development

No.

Hazard

C

L

R

1.1.1

Failure of 5.5
m wide
supported
Roof

1

C

4

Crushed by
C/M in 5.5 m
wide roadway

1

1.1.2

Existing
Controls





D

7




Support System
designed for the
place
Support Rules
Inspections
Operator
competence
Safe Stand Areas
defined
Operator
competence

Potential
Controls
 Reduce roadway
width
 Install
secondary
support before
longwall retreat
 Install single
pass C/M

In Example 2 the team identified roof fall on the Long wall retreat as the highest risk, however the mining
conditions and mining method have led to a completely different outcome, substituting a standard C/M for a
single pass, wide-head machine. The risk of crush in a narrower roadway is mitigated by the wide head
configuration, limiting the ability of the C/M to slew during cutting.
Although the above examples are obvious they do illustrate the benefit of conducting site-specific risk
assessments to sort out where the priorities lie. Again it is apparent that prescription in legislation is not equipped
to determine the relative importance or severity of hazards for individual sites.
MAXIMUM REASONABLE CONSEQUENCE OF STRATA HAZARDS
From the HMS analysis of strata hazards it is apparent that the majority of hazards (82.4%) are objects falling. In
an underground environment, unless the objects are small they have the ability to inflict serious injury or result in
death.
Wherever the hazard relates to unsupported roof, the injury can only be a fatality because no controls are in place
to regulate the size of material. Likewise in some instances, high ribs for example, the consequence must be
serious injury to fatality.
The consequence of falling material can be reduced by installing hard barriers - support. By using support the size
of material can be controlled somewhat so the hazard changes from “fall of unsupported roof” to “fall of roof
between supports”. If for example 100 x 100 mm mesh is installed than the object size can be controlled to less
than the mesh size, consequently the maximum reasonable consequence may be reduced to a lost time injury.
Considering the application of soft barriers to a similar example eg personnel operating remote control continuous
miners are prohibited by the Regulations and Support Rules from going under unsupported roof without setting
some type of support. If the operator considers that his knowledge and experience allow him to make an accurate
assessment of the roof integrity, he could decide to disregard the rule and duck out to reset the miner. In this
example the soft barrier is quickly rendered ineffective by factors that at that moment are beyond the control of
the law or management. The maximum reasonable consequence in this case is fatality.
The preceding two examples consider different situations but the facilitator needs to be aware of the factors that
influence decisions people make and risk when conducting the risk assessment to ensure that the group does not
disregard or underestimate consequence on these types of issues. The hazards are situational and the group needs
to give careful consideration eg the size of the falling object before determining maximum reasonable
consequence. For roof fall hazards a useful means of grading hazards may be for the group to develop a guide
such as the example in Table 5.
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Table 5. – Example - Object size/ Injury Guide
Mass of Falling Object

Maximum Reasonable
Consequence

Less than 5 Kg

lost time Injury

5 Kg to 10 Kg

serious Injury/
permanent disability

More than 10 Kg

Injury resulting in loss of
life

The Mass of Falling Objects selected in Table 5 have been arbitrarily selected for the purpose of the example and
could vary, depending upon the mining height, strata type, local geology and stress.
We therefore know that it would be inappropriate to rate the consequence of a person injured by a fall of
unsupported roof as anything less than a single fatality because there is no control over the size or quantity of
material falling.
In a similar manner the maximum reasonable consequence of rib fall injuries is related to the size of material that
falls.
LIKELIHOOD
For qualitative risk assessments the terminology likelihood is preferable to probability or frequency. As
previously stated there is generally an absence of adequate data for statistical assessment of probability.
Furthermore people who are not familiar with probabilities will revert to qualitative descriptors to evaluate
likelihood in their own minds.
Likelihood relates to the likelihood of the event. For example when assessing the hazard of roof falling on a
person in a particular part of the mine, the likelihood is of a person being injured by a fall of roof and not the
likelihood of the consequence of the incident.
Factors that may affect the likelihood include:
•
•
•
•
•

Type of strata and support used.
Frequency of exposure to the hazard eg. exposure to bad roof on a travelling road compared to bad
roof in a waste areas.
Location of personnel in relation to the hazard eg personnel operating equipment adjacent to the goaf
compared to personnel grading an effectively supported transport road.
Prevailing conditions in the area eg. roof, rib, goaf pressure, structures.
Variability of the environment and presence of clear indicators eg. identification of orthogonal joint
sets in a pillar split.

Considering the risk matrix, it is apparent that one cannot reduce the risk of a catastrophic consequence hazard to
any less than 1 E (11) by making the event as “Practically Impossible”. The only way to reduce the risk of a
catastrophic consequence event further is to completely eliminate the hazard itself.
PRIORITISING ACCORDING TO RISK
The reason for prioritising according to risk is to enable allocation of resources for the development of appropriate
controls to maximise early benefit.
In accordance with AS/NZS 4360 (1999), risks should be “assessed in the context of existing controls”. This
causes considerable confusion for some operations. It has been found as a general rule, risks should be assessed
with hard barriers in place and assuming soft barriers are not in place or are ineffective. If we ignored hard
barriers that are functioning effectively, we would practically be assessing the risks of mining in the last century,
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and vastly over-estimating the risks. On the other hand, if we have not properly assessed the adequacy of soft
barriers prior to the assessment, we may have the false belief that we are protected when we are not in reality,
therefore under-estimating the risks. While competency is something we can measure and prove (or otherwise),
other “soft barriers” such as adherence to procedures and supervision can be variable, and are certainly not
foolproof controls. Soft barriers require constant monitoring, and a great deal of hard work to remain effective
controls. Human factors are discussed in more detail later in the paper.
Therefore while some hazards may appear to be ranked a little high considering the efforts an operation is
expending in controlling it, and a good track record may currently exist, this method serves to reinforce the
importance of constant vigilance in this area.
RISK CONTROLS - ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE RISK
The hierarchy of controls reflects a grading from that is most effective to the least effective. Table 6 illustrates the
types of strata controls commonly identified in relation to the recognised hierarchy of controls for minimising risk.
Table 6. – Hierarchy of Strata Control Examples
Hierarchy of Controls

Strata Control Examples

1.

Eliminate the hazard

Redesign of panel width to prevent full goaf caving
and eliminate windblast hazard

2.

Substitute alternative process/ equipment

Fixed cable handling device attached to continuous
miner to replace cable hand

3.

Engineering/ Isolation, including guards
and barriers

Breaker Line Supports replace breaking off timber in
Wongawilli extraction

4.

Procedures/ administration/ training

Pillar extraction operating procedures

5.

Personal Protective Equipment

Hard hat

Items 1 to 3 in Table 6can in general be considered hard barriers in that they are designed to physically separate
personnel from the hazard. Item 3, isolation and guards, can also be considered in part soft barriers because they
are reliant on people to ensure they are properly in place before they can provide the desired protection. Controls
of this nature are usually accompanied by procedural type controls. Items 4 and 5 are soft controls because they
rely on diligence to be effective.
Personal protective equipment is often the last resort for providing protection from hazards but is often used in
conjunction with other higher-level controls.
Mines should take care when deciding upon the level of control that choosing procedural over the seemingly more
expensive high-level controls could well result in higher overall costs. The following example demonstrates this
principle:
Example 3. – Rib Control
Workings oriented sub-parallel to the major cleat in a bord and pillar operation were experiencing increasing rib
spall with increasing depth of cover. Slabs up to 20 m long and 1 m thick were detaching in panels being
developed for extraction. There was a cultural resistance to supporting ribs and the mine was financially
constrained.
Installation of rib dowels would have placed additional financial strain on the business and the allocation of
limited resources to rib bolting all headings would impinge on productivity.
The solution derived was to change the orientation of subsequent panels (a level 1 control) and adopt a rib support
program based on assessment of ribs (a level 4 control). Rib dowels installed are a level 3 control. The rib
support program was sustainable, resulting in mainly only pillar corners requiring support, without affecting
productivity.
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Mines are now realising the resources required for maintenance of work procedures. Most operations have at least
one person on site, dedicated full time to managing systems and procedure documentation. In addition as well as
the training costs there is the on-going commitment to involving personnel and outside experts in reviewing and
updating. It makes good business sense to eliminate hazards at their source once and for all through the
application of higher-level controls and to minimise the use of procedural controls.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT
Despite the increased popularity of risk assessments, there are areas of concern that mines and facilitators need to
be aware of in their use.
The purpose of risk assessments is not to provide excuses for not being diligent in the manner in which risks are
managed. Invariably a risk assessment will lead to further work, research, data collection, training or analysis or
design work, but focused to reduce risk exposure in the subject area. They should never be taken as a definitive
solution in isolation but an action plan based on valid assessment of the risks.
Additional limitations of risk assessments include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Risk Team disbanded or partially disbanded before the risk assessment controls are finalised. This
applies particularly operational staff at shift change.
Inappropriate selection of team members such that the required experience and expertise is not covered
eg. topping up numbers from people on rehabilitation.
Participants who attempt to direct the process towards preconceived outcomes.
Failure of the group to reach consensus in determining risk due to pre-set agendas – usually
management or rushing to complete.
Poor or inadequate definition of the hazard or loss scenario.
Tendency to underestimate consequence and cultural risk tolerance. In-house facilitators could be part
of a risk tolerant culture and fail to challenge the team to consider risk from an unbiased viewpoint
Assessment with soft barriers effectively in place can be lead to false assessment of the actual risk
Unqualified transposing of results from one risk assessment site to another.
Ambiguous or incorrect wording of potential controls.
Failure to assign people to risk assessment outcomes or actions and failure of management to follow-up
to ensure they are done.
Failure to implement the agreed controls.
Failure to review the risk assessment at some future time to confirm that the controls are effectively
implemented.
Disinterested participants don’t exercise diligence during the process. Everything ends up a 3 C (13).
Over-complication or over-simplifying the risk assessment scope. The process must be time and cost
effective yet comprehensive enough to ensure important issues are properly addressed.
Assumptions and limitations in relation to the risk assessment topic are inadequately defined.

HUMAN ELEMENT
It is important to understand that behavioural factors play a significant role in the effectiveness of the risk controls
that are nominated. For example, despite legislation, rules and procedures people still get injured doing exactly
the things rules were designed to prevent. It is for this reason that soft barriers should be disregarded during risk
assessments and the hierarchy of controls should be closely adopted in order to achieve effective risk reduction.
Pitzer (2000) investigates risky behaviour in relation to personnel working around remote control continuous
miners. In his paper he found that mine workers identified the following face-area risk in order of severity:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Rib spall
Roof fall
Hit by shuttle car
Struck by miner
Hit by loose rock
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There was a perceived lower risk from roof fall than rib spall because of an ingrained assumption that the roof was
controlled by support whereas ribs are often not, and of equipment being competently controlled by an operator
whereas there was no one in control of the ribs. (Pitzer, 2000).
Another interesting finding by Pitzer was that personnel routinely enter dangerous work areas such as unsupported
roof areas despite legislation and rules to the contrary. Mineworkers stated that they would enter unsupported
roof areas without using temporary support to rectify equipment breakdowns or quickly reset equipment. This
was often done with the full knowledge the supervisor. Risk assessment facilitators and risk management system
development teams need to be aware of and understand the motivation of these foolish acts of risk taking
behaviour that may be present in individuals and in some workplace cultures.
Whilst ever there is potential for risk taking behaviour to exist or be introduced mines need to place greater
emphasis and insistence on hard barriers over soft controls.
Human error encompasses more than blatant disregard for rules. Mistakes, slips and lapses are also possible.
MISTAKES
Mistakes are self explanatory and result for a variety of reasons. The may occur because a person thought he was
using the correct procedure, or had the correct information, and didn’t. These occur because people assume they
have the correct information and neglect to verify the information is correct. It may result from being supplied
incorrect procedures (wrong version) or data (out-of-date or wrong purpose).
SLIPS & LAPSES
Mining people can all relate to having at some time found othemselves in a position that, had they had their wits
about them we would not have happened eg. like being chased up the rib by a continuous miner boom as the
operator backs it out of a lift. Even the more experienced personnel, in a place fully signposted and with which
they are intimately familiar, can mistakenly find themselves in a less than desirable position.
Example 4 – OOPs I didn’t realise I was under unsupported roof
This example refers to the cut flit system of mining. A senior experienced mining official proceeded to walk past
the “Last Bolt” sign in a recently cut place, looked up and realised he was well inbye the last row of bolts, and
warning sign. This time he escaped injury!
Following this example the “Last Bolt” signs were upgraded to a portable barricade, consisting a steel tube that
screws onto the last bolt. Two hinged arms are folded down to the horizontal position to form a barricade across
the roadway at chest height. On the barricade was attached “No Road” signs and a blackboard for mining officials
to record inspection details.
DEVIANT VIOLATIONS
Occasionally personnel believe they know a quicker or better way of doing things and disregard the rules.
Thankfully instances of this type of violation appear to be less frequent than other human errors, however a person
may choose to disregard a rule, believing he is working in the interest of the mine and that this level of experience
allows him to make that judgement.
CULTURAL VIOLATION
Use of external resources such as OEMs, geotech consultants and the like should be encouraged, both as team
members, and specialist facilitators and scribes. This will avoid bias and vested interests compromising the
results of the risk assessment, and ensure the process and results are adequately documented
Example 5 – Working Under Unsupported Roof
At a mine operating the cut and flit system of mining, personnel were told to “hog-out” and move the remote
miner to perform the next cut and not to worry about cleaning the slack coal off the floor. This was some how
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interpreted as management condoning the relaxation of safety standards. The slack coal left on the floor caused
problems for the bolter.
Due to traction difficulties of the mobile bolter in slack coal, the bad habit developed of sending an Eimco into the
unsupported place to clean the floor before bolting. The paradox of this practice is that prior to remote control
miners the rule ingrained in the mine culture was that the miner would not proceed beyond the last line of
supports. The Eimco operator relied entirely on one control, the roll bar-type canopy fitted to the Eimco that did
not provide complete cover for the operator and had a very much lower rating than a manual miner canopy.
Although this behaviour had been identified by the risk assessment process as high risk and the principle of not
going under unsupported roof had not changed, acceptance of this practice by front-line and middle management,
allowed it to become ingrained in the culture of the work place.
It took an outsider to recognise the ridiculous acceptance of risk behaviour before it could change. The practice
took some time of targeted education and clarification of business priorities to eliminate.
Example 6 – Re-stetting Gas Trips on Remote Control Continuous Miners
At a mine using remote control continuous miners in moderately gassy conditions, it was common for the miner
power to be tripped by gas in excess of 2%. The rule in the mine had always been that “No person shall go under
unsupported roof”.
The practice developed whereby people, including supervisors were going under unsupported roof to press the
reset button, located on the miner, to enable the power to be reset. Apparently they made a judgement that by
testing the roof and making a quick dash out and back that they were reducing their risk exposure- Dumb!!!
The reality of using a remote control continuous miner in extended cuts in a moderately gassy environment,
equipped with an automatic methane monitoring system set to trip power at 2% was that at some time the machine
would have to be recovered from unsupported roof areas. The inherent problem with the system was that the
means for resetting ie. support the roof into the miner was not part of the normal system of work and not the
natural choice for personnel. Add to this the willingness of supervisors to break the rules, led to this becoming
accepted practice.
Effective elimination of this practice required a fundamental redesign of the equipment provided to operators with
greater control over the mining process. Firstly the operator was provided with a numerical display of gas
readings that was able to be read from afar. Secondly the automatic methane monitoring system was upgraded to
provide continuous monitoring via battery back-up after the mains power was disconnected and the ability to be
reset from a remote location – the DCB. In addition intensive retraining and compliance auditing was conducted
to ensure the practice did not continue. The area was to be supported to repair other breakdowns.
Management are not always aware of the practices which apply and which are through by workers to be
acceptable to management. Many examples can be recounted in risk assessments where management’s
understanding of safe activities in the workplace have been shattered by comments to the contrary by face
personnel. It is for this reason that it is essential to include operators in the risk assessment process and also
reason for introducing outside perspectives on what is really an acceptable level of risk.
RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
NSW legislation is very focused on providing Rules eg. support, breakaway and brushing for face operations and
specifying the manner in which the rules themselves are to be developed, implemented, monitored and reviewed.
NSW does not require a hazard management system to administer these rules. Queensland legislation however
requires the development of a principal hazard management plan for strata, based on risk assessment and is less
prescriptive.
Despite the legal requirements, strata control management systems or plans are becoming increasingly common in
NSW. With reference to appropriate standards - in particular section 4.2.2 of AS4804 the Australian Standard for
Safety Management Systems, safety management systems should be based on the assessment of hazards.
Management systems are the means by which the interrelationships of the various system elements; such as rules,
procedures, standards, responsibilities, authority levels, and action response procedures, combine to control risk.
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At some mines the management systems are in themselves component or modules of an integrated business or
safety management system established in electronic form on a server with full document management and
security.
Risk management consultants often come across all encompassing and very comprehensive management system
documents that despite their excellent content are cumbersome and difficult to follow. There are few people apart
from management and those involved with the system development that require this level of detail in a one-stopshop. We recommend to clients that they break the system up into digestible elements so the people required to
use them can do so with ease. Administrative-type sections of the system should be removed for those that need
to conduct those tasks. For example the continuous miner operator skills and knowledge requirements are
completely different from those of a Shift Undermanager.
A natural hierarchy of system elements in an integrated mine safety system would place matters like document
control, auditing and responsibilities database as higher level systems, applicable across all hazard management
systems. Miner operators would only be concerned with support rules and support installation procedures for
example. Undermanagers would be involved in training, development, monitoring and compliance auditing.
It is important to clearly define roles within the strata control management system so people take the initiative to
ensure implementation to standard. To each person’s role should be attached the standard to be achieved and
means for that person to measure compliance to the particular standards. For example having miner operators
report each shift on the sections of roadway they have developed, including width and alignment and reasons for
any non-compliance. Similarly personnel installing roof supports should report on the areas supported, conditions
encountered, the level and type of support installed and reasons for any non-compliance with the support
standards. The mining official in charge of the panel should report on the findings during the shift and actions
taken in response to matters of non-compliance. It is important to get the activities for each role and the
corresponding responsibility for achieving the prescribed standard aligned. Without clear definition and logical
cause and effect type structures the management system will be less than effective.
Clause 48 of NSW Regulations seeks to involve mines in a process of evidence-based design of support systems,
presentation in understandable format and the training and monitoring of support systems. The principle of this
regulation is consistent with sound engineering and management practice.
Strata control management systems should further develop this philosophy in accordance with the particular
requirements of the mine. Geotechnical design methods and the intensity of monitoring will be very different
between mines compare a cut and flit in strong strata to longwall in soft strata.
The support designs will then be developed to accommodate expected conditions for which there may be several
levels of support.
A three level support regime is provided for mining below abandoned workings. Detailing the support standards
for predetermined mining domains as colour coded on mine operating plans as shown in Table 7.
Table 7. – Example of Colour Coded Support Regime
DOMAIN

APPLICABLE TO

SUPPORT STANDARD

Green

Mining below xxx Seam solid coal
and first workings as shown on Strata
Control Domain Plan

Mains Development Green Support Standard
Sub-panel Green Support Standard
Mains Development Green Breakaway Standard
Sub-panel Green Breakaway Standard

Amber

Mining below xxx Seam goaf areas
without pillar remnants as shown on
Strata Control Domain Plan

Mains Development Amber Support Standard
Sub-panel Amber Support Standard
Mains Development Amber Breakaway Standard
Sub-panel Amber Breakaway Standard

Mining in the zone of influence of
the xxx Seam goaf edges as shown
on Strata Control Domain Plan and
pillar remnants encountered

Mains Development Red Support Standard
Sub-panel Red Support Standard
Mains Development Red Breakaway Standard
Sub-panel Red Breakaway Standard

Red
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Having arrived at an appropriate support design based on all the evidence, including those matters identified by
the risk assessment process, namely the full range of design parameters - either defined or the flagged for
definition by the appropriate process, the System should then roll-out those design assumptions as triggers to
identify the appropriate type of support to be used and when conditions are outside the support design criteria, i.e.
“Stop Mining” and holla for the geotechnical engineer to reassess the support regime.
Personnel must be adept at verifying that the design criteria used to develop the support system, standard or rule is
present in the workplace in order to install the appropriate support for that ground. And quickly recognise when
the mining conditions are outside the scope of the support design.
Ensure that excuses and temptations to venture under unsupported roof areas are eliminated or tightly controlled
by the system.
Obtain input from the geotechnical design engineer on the strata monitoring program
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion the following points should be remembered:
•

Legislation has enshrined risk management in how we operate.

•

Risk assessment is a management tool and can be applied holistically to the business to identify the
critical areas of need, including safety and with an integrated systems approach achieve greater success.

•

Risk assessment does not replace sound evidence-based engineering design, but will alert engineer and
managers to all the issues in risk priority order at pre-design and pre-implementation stages.

•

Risk assessment has its limitations. Become proficient in its application and maximise benefits.

•

Action plans are essential. Follow-up outcomes to ensure they are implemented as intended.

•

Management systems must be presented in digestible chunks for those that are to use them – don’t
overburden people unnecessarily, teach them the bits in which they need to be proficient.

•

Assign clear logical responsibility to personnel according to their ability to control process.

•

Follow-up with support system monitoring, including behaviour compliance.

•

Independently audit actual implementation of effective control of hazards and not just the paper trail.
Be worried it you score 100%, you are probably not getting the whole story.

The philosophy of risk management is here to stay and is applicable to all areas of mining activity. Mines can
maximise benefit if they embrace the concept and apply it to the whole of the business to identify the important
issues and manage for greatest effect.
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